Compartmentalisation is a procedure which may be implemented by a country to define and manage animal subpopulations of distinct health status within its territory, in accordance with the recommendations in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (the Code), for the purpose of disease control and/or international trade.
Definition of Compartment Glossary – Compartment: means an animal subpopulation contained in one or more establishments under a common biosecurity management system with a distinct health status with respect to a specific disease or specific diseases for which required surveillance, control and biosecurity measures have been applied for the purpose of international trade.
Zoning and compartmentalisation are procedures implemented by a Member Country with a view to defining subpopulations of distinct health status within its territory – Zoning applies to an animal subpopulation defined primarily on a geographical basis (using natural, artificial or legal boundaries) – Compartmentalisation applies to an animal subpopulation defined primarily by management and husbandry practices related to biosecurity Zoning and Compartmentalisation are procedures for the purpose of disease control and/or international trade.
• A compartment must — be established with respect to one or more diseases — be clearly defined (location of components and functional units and their the interrelationships) — must take into account epidemiological factors, production systems, infrastructures and biosecurity practices, as well as surveillance
Compartmentalisation entails the definition of an animal sub-population of a specified health status within the national territory. This status is maintained through management and husbandry practices related to biosecurity, in compliance with the standards in the Terrestrial Code (Chapters 4.3 and 4.4.) or the Aquatic Code (Chapters 4.1. and 4.2.) and the recommendations in the relevant disease chapters. The national Veterinary Authority or Competent Authority for aquatic animal health is responsible for granting, suspending and revoking the status of a compartment. When a compartment is established to facili country or zone is free of the diseases of interest. The exporting country must be able to show that the compartmentalisation is supported by an effective biosecurity plan developed in close partnership with the relevant private sector. Disease epidemiology is an important factor in a decision to establish a compartment. No country can exclude the entry of wild birds carrying avian influenza viruses. The eradication of diseases from wild animal populations, both terrestrial and aquatic, may be impossible. For diseases that have a wildlife reservoir, biosecurity is an essential tool and the use of compartmentalisation may be the best option for establishing a disease free domestic population. The use of compartmentalisation should be supported by Member Countries not only as a trade facilitating measure but also as a tool to improve animal health and to reduce the risk of disease outbreaks. Strengthening Veterinary Services and Aquatic Animal Health Services and building effective Public–Private Partnerships with the livestock sectors and with the private veterinary sector, consistent with the OIE PVS Pathway concepts, are the keys to success.
Establishing and maintaining a disease free status in the entire national territory should be the final goal of OIE Member Countries. However, if this cannot be achieved in the short to medium term, a country may benefit from the establishment of a disease-free compartment for the purpose of disease control. All countries may use compartmentalisation as a preventative measure to preserve export markets in the case of a disease outbreak.
While zoning applies to an animal subpopulation defined primarily on a geographical basis (using natural, artificial or legal boundaries), compartmentalisation applies to an animal sub-population defined primarily by management and husbandry practices related to biosecurity. In practice, spatial considerations and good management play important roles in the application of both concepts. The Code recommendations for compartments cannot be applied in all situations. The effective implementation of the concept of compartmentalisation depends inter alia on the epidemiology of the disease, country factors, environmental factors, the biosecurity measures which may be applicable, the health status of animals in adjacent areas, surveillance and the public/private sector relationship. Compartmentalisation may be particularly applicable in intensive industries where production systems are vertically integrated. The document lists the principal issues which need to be addressed. Some issues are relevant to the infrastructure within which compartmentalisation for ND and/or AI may be effectively implemented, and others apply to the establishment and operation of individual compartments.
General principles applying to compartmentalisation ————–
The responsibilities of the Veterinary Authority regarding the infrastructure within which compartmentalisation may be effectively implemented and which needs to be in place prior to the establishment of any compartment, include: •
To ensure that the Veterinary Services have been evaluated, at least with respect to their ability to oversee the establishment and management of compartments (see below for the key elements of an evaluation);
• To ensure that effective partnerships have been developed between the veterinary services and the animal production and non-production sectors where there is a likelihood of compartmentalisation being applied; such partnerships may need to include related sectors such as equipment supply and maintenance, feed production and waste management;
• To ensure that an effective animal identification and traceability system is in place; depending on the animal sector, identification and registration may be done at the herd/flock, lot or individual animal level;
• To ensure that an effective certification system is in place to allow credible official certification of the health status of a compartment, and commodities that may be traded from it;
• To devise generic criteria, including for management and husbandry practices relating to biosecurity, which may be applicable generally to compartmentalisation;
• To devise model biosecurity plans in conjunction with interested animal sectors;
• To publicise the generic criteria and model biosecurity plans through official channels.
Application of compartmentalisation —————-
• Influenced by technical issues: — epidemiology of the disease(s) of concern — health status of animals in adjacent areas — structure and distribution of the animal population — country and infrastructure factors — environmental factors — biosecurity measures which may be applicable — the public/private relationship
• Compartment management should provide evidence / address: – Separation from potential sources of infection: • Physical and spatial factors that affect biosecurity • Infrastructural factors • Biosecurity Plan • Traceability system – Documentation – Surveillance of the agent(s) – Diagnostic capability – Emergency response and notification – Supervision and control of a compartment
ensure that the compartment is ‘epidemiologically’ closed throughout its routine operating procedures • potential pathways for introduction and spread • critical control points for each pathway • mitigating measures for each critical control point • detailed standard operating procedures (SOPs) • comprehensive Contingency Plan • reporting procedures to the Veterinary Authorities • program for educating and training personnel • surveillance program in placeàBiosecurity Plan* The effective implementation of the biosecurity plan should
implies: — the inventory and analysis of all hazards and potential pathogen risks for the compartment —the identification of the most appropriate biosecurity measures applied at the most effective and controlled points within the premise or its surroundings. — Well documented protocolsà• Biosecurity Plan : Evidence of the efficacy of the Biosecurity Plan should be structured in line with HACCP, and its risks assessed and documented regularly Application of HACCP at the farm
Traceability system • animal identification in line with OIE chapters 4.1 and 4.2; individual identification is desirable, if not feasible, sufficient information on assurances is provided • all animal movements in and out of the compartment should be recorded and when needed, certified by the Veterinary Authority • records must be kept within the compartment on internal animal movements
Documentation • should provide clear evidence that the biosecurity, surveillance, traceability and management practices are effectively applied • should include (records) all animal movements, feed sources, production records, illness and deaths, laboratory tests, visitors logbook, medications, etc • documentation on historical status of the compartment for the disease it was defined, and compliance with freedom requirements should be submitted to the Veterinary Authority when seeking recognition
allow verify the status of such a subpopulation with respect to such disease(s).àSurveillance of the agent(s) • surveillance system in place must comply with Ch. 1.4 • Sensitivity of the internal and external surveillance must be adjusted according to changes in risk levels • internal surveillance: must provide a baseline of the status, as well as procedures for early detection, and records of suspect investigations • external surveillance: to be able to identify changes in the surrounding level of exposure. Should be targeted at epidemiological units in close proximity to the compartment the surveillance and monitoring programme in place should
Diagnostic capability • provide a list of officially designated laboratories according to Chapter 1.1.3.for sample testing • provide type of tests to be conducted, capacity of laboratories, quality control procedures • laboratories should have systematic procedures for rapid reporting results to the Veterinary Authorities • where appropriate, results should be confirmed by an OIE reference laboratory
Emergency response • early detection, diagnosis and notification are essential • In event of suspicion of disease occurrence for which compartment was defined, Management must immediately notify Veterinary Authorities, and free status should be suspended, and if confirmed, revoked and importing countries notified as per Article 5.3.7 • management should notify the Veterinary Authorities the occurrence of any listed disease or breach in biosecurity, in which case status could be suspended • Veterinary Authority should describe procedures and measures applied for each circumstance
Supervision and Control • The Veterinary Authority as the final authority and should provide procedures for auditing and for granting, suspending and revoking the status of a compartment • The authority, organisation and infrastructure of the Veterinary Services (include. Laboratories) should be in line with Chapter 3.1 and clearly documented (confidence in the integrity of the compartment)
The key factors of an evaluation of the Veterinary Services of a country which proposes to implement compartmentalisation include:
• legislative and administrative infrastructures;
• independence in the exercise of official functions;
• coordination capability;
• adequacy of technical and financial resources;
• disease surveillance and diagnostic capability;
• knowledge of relevant animal production and non-production sectors;
• systems for the early detection of disease and emergency response;
• effective consultation with stakeholders;
• performance history, including the timeliness and accuracy of disease reporting.
A model biosecurity plan should address all relevant factors including:
• the partnership(s) between the veterinary services and the relevant enterprise(s);
• the means of making a practical assessment of the resources required and available – financial, human and technical;
• the means of identifying the relevant subpopulation and its distinct animal health status, including through the animal identification and traceability system, and the relevant management and animal health records;
• the necessary surveillance and the means to implement it, and the procedures for the investigation and reporting of disease incidents;
• the components of the establishment(s) and/or other premises operated by an enterprise which would constitute the compartment, and the common biosecurity management system under which they operate (for example, animal housing facilities, animal transport routes, feed distribution systems, work procedures), using diagrams to show flowpaths, functional boundaries etc;
• the relevant epidemiological factors, particularly the potential pathways for the entry and spread of pathogen(s) that are the subject of compartmentalisation, and the associated risks;
• indicative sanitary measures which would be necessary to manage the risks relating to the distinct animal health status of the subpopulation;
• how the necessary sanitary measures would be incorporated into the management and husbandry practices of the establishment(s) and other relevant premises, to produce standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the compartment;
• how the SOPs for the compartment would be audited to ensure that they are in accordance with the biosecurity plan;
• how the risks would be regularly re-assessed and the SOPs of the compartment adjusted appropriately.
Responsibilities in implementing compartmentalisation for avian influenza and/or Newcastle disease ————–
The veterinary services should be responsible for the following: ————–
• to develop effective partnerships with managers in the poultry production sector and related sectors (such as equipment supply and maintenance, feed production and waste management), and leaders in other relevant avian sectors such as village poultry, small poultry farmer flocks, game bird flocks, ornamental birds, racing pigeons, and zoological collections;
• through such partnerships, to gain a good knowledge and understanding of the structure and operations of the various avian sectors (production and non-production);
• through effective surveillance, to ensure a good knowledge and understanding of the avian disease situation (particularly for AI and ND) within and outside the compartment, including in wild birds. This surveillance should be conducted in accordance with Code Appendix 3.8.1 ‘general guidelines for animal health surveillance’; Appendix 3.8.9 ‘guidelines for the surveillance of avian influenza’; and Appendix 3.x.x ‘surveillance for Newcastle disease’(under development);
• to support surveillance through the testing of samples at laboratories operating in accordance with the Manual. Each laboratory that conducts testing should have systematic procedures for rapid reporting of disease results to the Veterinary Administration. Where appropriate, results should be confirmed by an OIE reference laboratory.
• to provide scientific data that explain the epidemiology of AI and ND, and the associated risk pathways, in the part of the country in which compartments will be located;
• through these partnerships, to draw up biosecurity plans for particular compartments based on agreed SOPs;
• to regularly review scientific data on AI and ND and re-assess the risk factors, to ensure that the SOPs continue to be appropriate to the situation;
• to develop and implement audit and review procedures to ensure that the agreed SOPs are being implemented
The avian production and relevant other avian sectors should be responsible for the following:
• to develop effective partnerships with the veterinary services;
• to enhance the awareness of bird owners, bird handlers and hobbyists etc in the non-production sectors, and poultry workers, transporters, maintenance personnel etc, in the production sector, of general biosecurity principles and particularly those applicable to AI and ND;
• to report accurately and in a timely manner to the Veterinary Services on disease incidents occurring in the sector;
• to encourage the management of establishments and other relevant premises in a generally biosecure manner; for example through the development and application of codes of practice;
• to work with the Veterinary Services in the development of biosecurity plans and in the operation of compartments in accordance with these biosecurity plans.
While these responsibilities should be addressed in partnership, the final authority for the purposes of disease surveillance and reporting, disease control and veterinary certification for international trade lies with the Veterinary Authority.
Elements of a biosecurity plan for a compartment ——-
The biosecurity plan should clearly define the compartment through: ———
• a description of the establishment(s) and other relevant premises under common management practices related to biosecurity;
• a description of the avian subpopulation comprising the compartment (the epidemiological unit) based on the application of animal identification and traceability in accordance with the Code; depending on the sector, this may be done at the flock, lot or individual bird level;
• a description of the partnership between the Veterinary Services and the relevant establishment(s), and documentation of their respective responsibilities;
• a description (for example through process flowcharts) of the functional relationships between components of the compartment showing their contribution to the epidemiological separation between poultry in the compartment and other subpopulations, including through
o common management or ownership of poultry,
o adoption of industry plans that contain biosecurity guidelines eg health improvement plans and breed registries, o integration or grouping of establishments supplying poultry for production or slaughter with related functional units (such as feed mills, slaughterhouses, rendering plants etc);
• a description of the spatial factors relating to pathways of AI or ND transmission to ensure that there is adequate physical separation of the birds in the compartment from nearby animal subpopulations of different or unknown health status, including
o the locations and the AI and/or ND status of the nearest domestic and wild flocks,
o for AI, the locations of the nearest domestic and wild pig herds,
o for AI, the locations of any human cases of infection with HPAI;
• the location of bird houses within the compartment with regard to birds of lower or unknown health status outside the compartment; the spatial separation that would preclude direct contact or aerosol spread would be a minimum of 300 metres for AI and a minimum of 1-2 Km for ND;
• a description of the relevant environmental factors that may affect exposure to the pathogen(s), including————
o natural windbreaks and other barriers to pathogen spread,
o existence of wetlands or other geographic features attractive to large numbers of wild birds;
o expected pathogen survivability in the local environment,
• seasonal factors;
• documentation of the surveillance conducted for AI and/or ND to ensure that the subpopulation of birds in the compartment complies with the defined health status of the compartment (in accordance with the measures stipulated in Code Chapter 2.7.12 (Avian influenza) and/or 2.7.13 (Newcastle disease). Essential components include:————
• the documented baseline health status of the subpopulation before the compartment was established, indicating the dates of last disease occurrence (if any), the number of outbreaks and the methods of disease control that were applied,
• o evidence of compliance with Code Appendix 3.8.1, (‘general guidelines on animal health surveillance); Appendix 3.8.9 ‘surveillance for avian influenza; and Apendix 3.x.x. ‘guidelines on surveillance for Newcastle disease’ (under preparation).
• O procedures for the early detection of disease in the event that AI or ND enters the comp artment; for example, through the monitoring of parameters such as increased morbidity or mortality, reduced feed or water consumption, changes in behaviour, reduced egg production,
• o procedures for investigation of a suspect case, including reporting and subsequent management;
• a description of the potential pathways for the entry into and spread of AI and/or ND within the compartment, and of the associated risks; consideration should be given to bird movements; rodents; wild birds; aerosols; arthropods, vehicles, people, biological products, equipment; fomites, feed; waterways; drainage; and to the survivability of AI/ND in the environment. ——–
• a description of the procedures in place to regularly review scientific data relating to these pathways and risks;
• documentation of ————-
o the critical control points for each pathway and the measures to manage each critical control point,
• standard operating procedures (SOP) including for the implementation, maintenance and monitoring of these measures at the level of the compartment and at the level of establishment(s) and other relevant premises,
• o the steps taken by the Veterinary Services to verify the baseline health status of birds in the compartment;
• full documentation of the compartment’s SOPs, to provide clear evidence that they are adequate to meet the definition of the compartment, including——–
• personnel training——-
•
• generic hygiene and biosecurity principles and procedures ß procedures applicable to maintaining biosecurity for AI and/or ND
• the specific procedures to be followed, such as human and animal movement controls, o quality assurance schemes (if any) in operation,
• o animal movement controls———–
•
• in the case of poultry that are not confined to houses, for example free-range domestic poultry, procedures are in place to prevent their contact with animals from outside the compartment, especially wild birds
• facilities are in place, for example netting, to prevent other animals especially wild birds from entering bird houses
• for an AI compartment, procedures are in place to prevent other epidemiologically relevant animals (eg cats, pigs) from entering the compartment
• if birds or hatching eggs are sourced from outside the compartment, procedures are in place to ensure that the birds are sourced only from flocks of approved status for AI and/or ND
• the bird/hatching egg handling and transport procedures operate in a biosecure manner through the use of either equipment dedicated to the compartment or appropriately cleaned and disinfected equipment
• if the establishment(s) is/are not run on an all-in-all-out production basis, procedures are in place to ensure the appropriate separation between production groups and from newly introduced birds,
• O poultry health —————-
• appropriate flock breeding and production records are available
• morbidity and mortality history is available
• details of medications used (including vaccines) and treatment outcomes are available
• arrangements for veterinary involvement in flock health, and disease diagnosis and reporting are appropriate
• procedures are in place for the identification, handling, storage and disposal of sick and dead birds in a biosecure manner; these procedures comply with the relevant environmental legislation,
• O human movement controls—————
• there is functional boundary fencing, with cleared areas and secure access points, and appropriate signage
• procedures are in place, for example through the use of colour-coded clothing and one-way entries, to regulate the movement of humans within the compartment
• procedures are in place for regulating visitor access to premises in the compartment, for example through the use of a visitor logbook, restrictions on prior contact with birds outside the compartment, the use of disinfectant footbaths at all entries, and procedures for hand-washing and the provision of clean clothing and footwear for visitors who may come into contact with birds in the compartment
• procedures are in place for regulating the access and movements of visiting workers and their equipment (including veterinarians, contractors, maintenance personnel, bird handlers and feed delivery personnel) to premises and to bird houses in the compartment, for example through the use of a visiting worker logbook, restrictions on prior contact with birds outside the compartment, the use of footbaths with disinfectant at all entries, the use of hand-washing, clean clothing and footwear
• procedures are in place for ensuring that different groups of birds within the compartment are handled in a biosecure manner, for example through handling young birds before older birds, segregating birds under suspicion of health problems, working with the flow of bird movements in the production cycle not against it
• procedures are in place for dealing with emergencies that threaten the health status of the compartment through additional measures such as showering and complete clothing changes for workers dealing with ‘at risk’ poultry
• restrictions are in place regarding employee contact with birds outside the compartment, for example: employees are not permitted to own birds or other epidemiologically relevant animals, and must have no contact with birds of lesser or unknown health status within 48 hours prior to entering the compartment,
• controls over vehicles —————-
procedures are in place for regulating visitor vehicle access to the premises
procedures are in place for regulating the activities of work vehicles relevant to the compartment (such as feed delivery, bird delivery and pickup, litter delivery and removal, and maintenance vehicles) for example
• those operating solely within the compartment are subject to regular cleaning and disinfection
• those with access to premises outside the compartment are subject to full cleaning and disinfection immediately upon entering the compartment,
• security of feed and water sources
the water supply is known to be free from contamination with avian pathogens through the use of either mains water or appropriately treated water (for example through chlorination or UV treatment) from other sources
if any feed is sourced from outside the compartment, that feed supply is known to be free from contamination with avian pathogens through the use of approved/audited suppliers and production methods
the feed transport and handling facilities operate in a biosecure manner through the use of either dedicated equipment or equipment which is cleaned and disinfected before being used for feed destined for use in the compartment,
• management of environmental risks
there is no standing water or other sources of attraction for wild birds on the premises or close by
there are no unprotected heaps of feed or manure/litter, or used equipment or housing material close to bird houses or free-range birds, o buildings and equipment
bird house ventilation air inlets and outlets are suitably oriented to minimise the likelihood of disease spread
equipment coming into contact with birds is either dedicated to the compartment or is appropriately cleaned and disinfected immediately upon entry to the compartment
at the end of a production batch, the bird houses are cleaned and disinfected, and then closed until next use, and all litter removed from the compartment; • documentation of the programming and performance of audits, to verify the AI and/or ND status of the compartment, through regular re-assessment of the risks and of the continued appropriateness of the SOPs.
By- DR TAPAN KR. SAHU, CHIEF QUARANTINE OFFICER,(BENGALURU), GOVT. OF INDIA.
